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 I. INTRODUCTION 
Executive compensation attracts substantial attention since some corporate 
scandals such as Enron, Tyco and WorldCom. The literature on the 
determinants of pay at the top is extensive. Nevertheless, most of these 
studies focus on the executive compensation in widely-held companies that 
are present mostly in UK and USA. Consequently, most of the research is 
grounded in agency or managerialist perspectives. There is much less research 
about executive compensation in emerging markets. Most of the companies 
in developing countries are privately-held by families and presence of owner-
managers is not a rarity. These so-called “family firms” represent a different 
form of governance than that of widely-held firms. Thus, agency problem and 
consequently executive compensation issue has a distinct nature. At first, it 
can be suggested that agency costs arising from the conflict of interests 
between managers and owners should be minimized because the classical 
principal/agent problem does not exist in privately-held companies. This 
suggestion might be correct due to the alignment effect of large shareholdings 
by the owner-manager or controlling family. Moreover, owner-managers  are 
emotionally attached to their firms and since they are unlikely to compete in 
the external CEO market, they accept lower compensation for their service. 
According to Meija-Gomez et al., in family-controlled firms, risk averse agents 
trade higher job security for lower earnings if they are related to principles. 
On the other hand, due to emotional commitment strengthened by their 
control power,owner-managers may stay at the helm despite their poor 
performance, they may have a great discretion in the firm and hire some 
unqualified family members and distribute family wealth by paying high 
compensation to them, they may fail to grasp profitable investment 
opportunities by acting over risk-averse. 
Consequently, family-controlled public corporations create their own agency 
problems which differ from that of companies with dispersed owners.  
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Turkish firms, similar to many firms in countries that adopt insider1 corporate 
governance regimes,  exhibit concentrated ownership structures. Most of the 
companies are privately-held, majority in the hands of families. Protections 
offered to minority shareholders is limited. Above mentioned features, 
together with its relatively higher growth rates in recent years and 
developments in its capital markets, makes Turkey an interesting country to 
examine. 
This thesis focuses on the impact of ownership concentration on the level of 
total remuneration paid to executives. The purpose is to find out if 
performance is an important determinant of pay and to determine to what 
extent and in which direction the ownership concentration influence 
executive compensation in Turkish listed companies.  
The analysis relies on a six-year unbalanced panel dataset of roughly 203 
companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). The regression models 
control for firm size, firm performance and ownership concentration at the 
direct level.  
The layout of the thesis is as follows: the second chapter is the review of 
existing literature, grouped under two subsections. The first subsection briefly 
explains the framework of corporate governance, different regimes in 
different countries, also provides an insight of corporate governance 
landscape in Turkey. The second subsection reviews the ownership structures, 
agency problems and executive compensation issues. The third chapter 
describes the dataset and provides summary statistics of the sample. The 
fourth chapter explains the modeling approach. The fifth chapter reports and 
interprets the results, and the final chapter concludes.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1 Insider corporate governance systems are found in the countries that adopt civil law 
traditions.  
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 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE2  
Definitions of Corporate Governance 
There is no commonly accepted definition of corporate governance although 
its importance in shaping economical landscape of a country cannot be denied 
is clear.  
The narrow view of corporate governance focuses on the classical 
principal/agent framework which is present in companies with dispersed 
owners. From this point of view, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) defined corporate 
governance as follows: “Corporate governance deals with the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on 
their investment”. This definition is grounded in agency theory with an 
investor perspective. In this view, corporate governance is about ensuring 
that the firm is run in the interests of its shareholders (Yurtoglu, 2009). 
Corporate governance in this narrow view covers three categories of 
institutional differences: (1) identities of the owners of corporations, and size 
distribution of their ownership stakes, (2) the governance structure of 
corporations, (3) the legal and political institutions that affect managerial 
behavior (Yurtoglu, 2009). 
There is another definition of corporate governance with a broader view 
which also considers other stakeholders of the firm. Corporate governance 
from a stakeholder perspective which takes into account the employees, 
suppliers and customers of the firm is defined by Zingales (1998) as follows: 
“Governance system is the complex set of constraints that shape the ex post 
bargaining over the quasi rents generated in the course of a relationship and 
shape the ex-post bargaining over them”.  
                                                            
2  See Yurtoglu(2008) for an extensive survey. 
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Allen (2005) made another definition of corporate governance from the 
stakeholder perspective: “Corporate governance is concerned with ensuring 
that firms are run in such a way that society’s resources are used efficiently”.    
From the same point of view, Berglöff and von Thadden (2000) suggested that 
protection of creditors and strategic equity investors might be more 
important than the protection of small minority investors for attracting 
capital.  
Firstly Asian crisis and then corporate collapses of Enron and WorldCom in 
North America and Parmalat, Scandia, etc. in Europe have constituted a mile 
stone in corporate governance area. Existing corporate governance practices 
have been put under the spotlights. During the period following these 
collapses, corporate governance re-attracted substantial attention. In addition 
to growing research and literature, OECD published its Corporate Governance 
Principles as a blueprint for the reforms needed. Starting with the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (2002) in the USA, the reforms in order to improve the corporate 
governance standards spread all over the world.  
Additionally, the higher degrees of economical globalization and increasing 
need for external financing induced the companies to adopt good corporate 
governance practices in order to attract investors and reach capital at low 
costs. One of the most important consequences of the increasing economic 
integration of the world’s economies is an increase in the strength of 
competition. Due to trade liberalization, liberalization of financial markets and 
advances in the information and communication technologies, companies 
must not only compete with other within their country, but with firms from 
around the world (Gugler, Muller and Yurtoglu, 2004).  
Corporate Governance Regimes 
There are different corporate governance regimes. Although there is some 
literature suggesting that individual firms can distinguish themselves by some 
voluntary mechanisms, such as cross-listing in another country with stricter 
and better corporate governance regime, it is widely accepted that firms in a 
country are not independent of the corporate governance system of that 
country. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998) 
emphasized significant differences between civil law and common law 
systems with respect to shareholder protection. Degree of protection offered 
to shareholders and enforcement of contracts are also of great importance for 
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corporate governance. From this point of view, it can be suggested that 
corporate governance regimes of a country is substantially influenced by (and 
related to) its law tradition and legal origin.  
Common law system is adopted by Anglo-Saxon countries in which the firms 
exhibit dispersed ownership structures. One exception to this is Hong Kong 
with its concentrated ownership structure. USA, UK and former British 
colonies adopt common law systems.  
Civil law system, though derived from different legal origins, is present in non-
Anglo-Saxon countries. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV) 
made a classification within civil law system according to legal origins such as 
French, German and Scandinavian systems. According to LLSV, French system 
offers the lowest protection to shareholders amongst others whereas 
Scandinavian system provides the strongest shareholder protection.  
As suggested by LLSV, also widely accepted, the common law systems offer 
outside and minority shareholders greater protection against expropriation by 
managers than do the civil law systems. 
It can be suggested that the corporate governance regime in the USA has 
been even more Anglo-Saxon after the corporate collapses of Enron and 
WorldCom. The direction of the convergence of corporate governance 
regimes is towards Anglo-Saxon system. The corporate governance guidelines 
that had been issued in European countries, though being only 
recommendary, brought these countries with French and German legal origins 
closer to the Anglo-Saxon system. Moreover, many companies in the 
continental Europe commit themselves to stricter shareholder protection by 
cross-listing in New York and London stock exchange.  
In addition to above mentioned research, there is an extensive literature on 
the relationship between good corporate governance practices and 
macroeconomic performance. Ararat and Ugur, in their paper in 2006, 
inspected the reverse causality between macroeconomic performance and 
good corporate governance practices. They investigated in depth the 
macroeconomic situation in Turkey before 2001 and the phases of 
improvement of Turkish economy that started in 2001. They reported that the 
transition from a discretion policy to a rule-based economic policy has a 
substantial effect in economical performance which in turn leads to 
improvement of corporate governance landscape of Turkey.  
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Ararat and Ugur (2003) developed a model to explain how poor public 
governance and macroeconomic instability affect corporate governance 
quality. In this model, the authors made some behavioural assumptions both 
from the perspective of firms and shareholders. According to their model, the 
shareholders value the corporate governance standards of the companies 
they invest. On the other hand, the companies value the loyalty of 
shareholders. Both parties are subject to some costs due to their behaviours; 
the cost of complying with good corporate governance standards for the firms 
and cost of loyalty to the shares of a firm for the shareholders. Consequently, 
the firms have an incentive to minimize the cost of corporate governance 
whereas; the shareholders have an incentive of investing in other firms` 
shares. Under these assumptions, the authors draw the reaction functions for 
each level of firm - shareholder commitment. The authors investigated these 
behavioural assumptions and the resulting reaction functions of the two 
parties under two circumstances. Firstly, they modeled the case that 
shareholder loyalty and corporate governance quality are complementary, 
meaning that both parties reward an increase in the other’s behavior. The 
reaction functions of any given level of commitment are shown in Figure 1. 
FIGURE 1: 
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The slope of reaction functions of both parties have positive slopes reflecting 
that the shareholders will increase their loyalty to the firm if there is an 
increase in corporate governance standards, and the firm will increase its 
corporate governance standards if there is an increase in the shareholder 
loyalty. The equilibrium shareholder loyalty (L*) and corporate governance 
quality (Q*) is obtained at point A. The authors afterwards assumed that there 
is a crisis in the economy. The crisis has its first impact on the level of 
shareholder loyalty caused by the international investors selling the shares of 
the firm and investing in other countries followed by further sales by the local 
investors. Therefore, the reaction function of the shareholders shifts 
downwards to 𝑅′𝑠. The new equilibrium, though being temporary, is at point 
B. Secondly, the firms react to this decrease in shareholder loyalty and the 
reaction function of the firms shift left to 𝑅′𝑓. The final equilibrium is obtained 
at point A’ indicating lower shareholder loyalty and consequent lower 
corporate governance quality.  
As mentioned before, the authors also modeled the case that shareholder 
loyalty and corporate governance quality are substitutional. In this case, both 
parties free-ride on each other`s efforts, meaning that the shareholders 
decrease their loyalty when there is an increase in the corporate governance 
quality of the firms they invest in and on the other hand the firms have an 
incentive to decrease their corporate governance quality when there is an 
increase in shareholder loyalty. Therefore, the reaction functions of the both 
parties have a negative slope. Applying the same logic to this case, the 
reaction functions and the equilibrium level of commitment are shown in 
Figure 2. The initial equilibrium shareholder loyalty and and corporate 
governance quality is at point A. In the case of substitutional shareholder 
loyalty and corporate governance commitment, the firms increase their 
corporate governance quality when the shareholders reduce their loyalty to 
the shares of the firms in the times of a crisis. Consequently, the reaction 
function of the shareholders shifts left and the temporary equilibrium is 
obtained at point B referring to a lower shareholder loyalty level and a higher 
level of corporate governance quality. In this case, the firms increase their 
corporate governance quality in order to offset the negative effects of 
reduced loyalty and to attract the shareholders to invest in their firms. 
However, keeping up with high levels of commitment to corporate 
governance causes costs to the firms. Therefore, after a while the firms also 
reduce the quality of corporate governance and the reaction function of the 
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firms shifts left and the final equilibrium is obtained at point A´ that refers to 
lower shareholder loyalty and consequently lower corporate governance 
quality.  
FIGURE 2: 
 
 
Source: Ugur and Ararat (2003) 
The authors suggest that the regulatory corporate governance reforms 
introduced by governments would not be incentive-compatible for the firms 
since in case of an introduction of a mandatory corporate governance code, 
the firms would have to commit higher levels of corporate governance quality 
which will cause a rightwards shift of the reaction function of the firms to 𝑅𝑓 . 
The consequent equilibrium point would then be B, referring a high level of 
corporate governance quality despite a lower shareholder loyalty when 
compared to pre-crisis equilibrium (point A). Ugur and Ararat (2003) 
suggested that, under this circumstance the firms would have an incentive to 
deviate from mandatory corporate governance standards mainly by providing 
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poor quality disclosure in case of a dispersed ownership structure and by 
engaging in tunneling in case of concentrated ownership structure. 
Consequently, the authors claimed that although the reaction function of the 
firm might be at 𝑅𝑓, its actual reaction function would gradually shift to the 
left until 𝑅′𝑓 coincides with the pre-reform function 𝑅𝑓.     
 
Corporate Governance in Turkey 
Turkey belongs to the French origin of civil law tradition. As is mentioned, 
French origin corporate governance system, amongst other systems within 
civil law tradition, provides the weakest protection to minority shareholders.  
From its foundation in 1923 until the reforms to establish pro-market policies 
in 1980, Turkish state was the main player in the economy. Since the private 
sector did not have the sufficient resources, the state was involved in the 
economy, subsidizing the private sector.  
In 1980, import substitution policies were replaced by an export-led 
stabilization and structural adjustment program (Ararat, Yurtoglu, 2007). The 
liberalization of capital market took place over 1980-1989 period. Within this 
process, The Capital Market Law (CML) was enacted in 1981 and the Capital 
Market Board3 (CMB) was established in 1982, and finally, Istanbul Stock 
Exchange4 (ISE) was reopened in 1986. 
A discretionary policy framework, economical crisis and macroeconomical 
instability prevail over 1990 – 2000 period. The 1999 and 2000 economical 
crisis put these discretionary policies under the spot lights and starting from 
2002 there had been changes in the effectiveness of regulatory authorities, 
disclosure and transparency rules that apply to companies, and the 
enforcement of laws.  
The return to a rule-based macroeconomical policy framework and the 
increased probability of economic stability increased the feasibility of 
corporate governance reforms (Ugur and Ararat, 2003). 
                                                            
3 CMBT is a semi-governmental agency in charge of oversight of Istanbul Stock Exchange. 
4  ISE is owned by its members and governed by its general assembly. 
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Corporate governance reforms started with the launch of Corporate 
Governance Guideline5 by the Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMBT) in 
2003. The Guideline was prepared with an inspiration from the Corporate 
Governance Principles which were issued by OECD after the corporate 
scandals in North America and Europe.  
CMBT’s Guideline is voluntary that includes more than 100 provisions as 
recommendations for the good governance of the listed companies on a 
“comply or explain” approach. The provisions can be classified under four 
groups such as; shareholders’ rights, disclosure and transparency, boards, and 
stakeholder relations. 
With the adoption of the Guideline by the CMBT, the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) became an optional standard for the companies 
listed on Istanbul Stock Exchange.  
As a consequence of the above mentioned improvements, the European 
Commission recommended in 2004 that the European Union can start 
accession negotiations with Turkey. As is also mentioned by Ugur and Ararat 
(2006), European Commission reported “Economic stability and predictability 
have been substantially improved since the 2001 economic crisis. Persistently 
high levels of inflation have come to historic lows, political inference has been 
reduced, and the institutional and regulatory framework has been brought 
closer to international standards. Thus, an important change towards a stable 
and rule-based economy has taken place.” 
Although , it is strictly recommended by the CMBT that the voluntary 
Guideline should be taken seriously, there were no sufficient references to 
the Guideline in the 2003 annual reports of the listed companies. In order to 
induce the adaptation of the Guideline and improve the compliance, CMBT 
announced that starting from 2004, all listed companies are obliged to add a 
“Corporate Governance Compliance Report” to their annual report. The CMBT 
prepared a standard report template.  
Another effort of the CMBT to improve the governance standards of the listed 
companies was the announcement of a “Corporate Governance Index” to 
differentiate the companies that comply with the Guideline. ISE was 
responsible for the construction of this index. ISE, in 2005, announced that 
                                                            
5 Corporate Governance Guideline was ammended in 2005. 
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the “Corporate Governance Index” would be launched as soon as five 
companies meet the requirement criteria. In order to be considered as 
“qualified”, the companies should receive a corporate governance score of 6 
out of 10. It was also announced, to increase the incentive of the companies, 
that the “qualified” companies are subject to a discount of 50% on the listing 
fees. The “Corporate Governance Index” was launched on 31st August 2007, 
however. Currently, 32 firms are listed under this index of the ISE. The 
companies should have a corporate governance score of 7 out of 10 and the 
qualified companies are entitled to a 50% discount for the first two years, 25% 
discount for the next two years and 10% for the coming years.  
Despite the improvements, the legislative framework was a major obstacle for 
real reform. Turkish Commercial Law has not been revised since it was 
enacted in 1957. The government decided in 1999 to have the Commercial 
Law rewritten. A committee that consists of 45 members was established for 
this purpose. The draft was submitted to the Parliament in 2005. It was 
expected to be enacted by 2006 but the new Commercial Law was blocked by 
the opposition party in the Parliament. Finally, it was enacted on the 13th of 
February 2011. The new Commercial Code includes roughly all the articles in 
the Guideline and it is mainly based on equality, accountability and 
transparency.  International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) become 
mandatory for all joint stock companies, also for the ones that are not open to 
public. 
2.2. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION 
Ownership Structure and Executive Compensation in Anglo-
Saxon and Non-Anglo-Saxon Countries 
In Anglo-Saxon countries, most of the firms exhibit the features that Berle and 
Means modeled in 1932. The ownership is distributed among a large number 
of dispersed shareholders and the managers own too little of their company’s 
shares in “Berle and Means’ Corporation”. Separation of ownership and 
management created an “agency problem” due to the conflict of interests 
between owners (dispersed shareholders) and the managers. The owners try 
to maximize their wealth (shareholder value), whereas the managers have an 
incentive to minimize their efforts. Moreover, it is difficult for the dispersed 
shareholders to monitor the actions of the managers due to information 
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asymmetries and cost of monitoring. Under these conditions, managers might 
take the advantage of the fact that their actions will not be observed strictly 
by the shareholders; they might use their discretion for their private benefits 
and hence distort the benefits of the shareholders and finally hurt firm´s 
performance.  For example, they may fail to distribute the excessive cash 
although there is no profitable investment opportunity for the firm (Jensen, 
1986). Being not the only one, executive compensation is one of the ways that 
managers can expropriate shareholders’ wealth.  Due to power relationships 
with the directors, the CEOs may enjoy attractive pay packages that are above 
their performance.  
The optimal contracting approach which has been the primary framework to 
explain executive compensation recognizes the compensation arrangements 
as a remedy to the “agency problem”. According to optimal contracting 
approach, the managers should be compensated in accordance with their 
performance and it suggests that tying pay to performance functions as an 
incentive mechanism to align the conflicting interests of shareholders and 
managers. 
In optimal contracting approach, the boards are assumed to make such pay 
arrangements that provide the managers the effective incentives to maximize 
shareholder value. However, whether the boards are really working for the 
favor of shareholders is questionable due to a number of reasons. 
In their paper in 2000, Bebchuk et al. introduce another approach to executive 
compensation. Their approach is “managerial power” approach which claims 
that the CEOs in widely-held companies have substantial power to determine 
their own pay. Bebchuk et al. attribute this discretion to the importance of the 
CEOs role for the re-appointment of the directors to the board and their effect 
on the compensations of the directors. It is worth mentioning here that the 
2001 compensation for each Enron director is $380,619, the seventh highest 
director compensation in the USA, as reported by The New York Times. Some 
other studies also suggest that CEOs have enough discretion to select new 
board members when ownership is dispersed (Mace, 1971; Lorsch and 
MacIver, 1989; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999).   
Accordingly, it is not surprising that the directors would like to build up a good 
relationship with the possible future CEO by not opposing their pay packages. 
Under these circumstances, the objectivity of the board of directors in 
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monitoring management is arguable. Shivdasani and Yermack report that 
when CEOs are involved in selecting directors, they choose directors who are 
less likely to monitor.  
In their work where they modeled CEO and director compensation, Brick, 
Palmon, and Wald found a positive relationship between CEO and director 
compensation. They hypothesized that this positive relationship could be due 
to unobserved firm complexity because in that case high levels of skills and 
effort by both CEO and the directors are of vital importance. Since the 
relationship they found between excess compensation and firm performance 
is negative, they attributed this excess compensation to mutual back 
scratching and cronyism.  
In the framework of optimal contracting approach, sensitivity of pay to 
performance is of great importance although evidence suggests that the 
relationship between pay and performance is weak even in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries. Jensen and Murphy (1990) report striking evidence on the 
weakness of compensation arrangements. They find that remuneration of the 
executives increases by only $3.25 for every $1000 change in shareholder 
wealth. More recently, Hall and Liebermann (1998) report $25 increase in 
executive compensation for every $1000 change in shareholder wealth 
suggesting higher pay-performance sensitivity, not being a substantial 
improvement though. These findings show that the performance is not a key 
determinant of executive compensation in large firms in US and UK, but there 
other factors affecting the level and composition of pay at the top.  Within the 
framework of the above evidence, it can be suggested that managerial power 
approach is more consistent with the reality. 
Non-Anglo-Saxon countries which belong to different legal origins of civil law 
tradition, exhibit concentrated ownership structures. The classical agency 
problem seen in Anglo-Saxon countries therefore does not exist due to the 
fact that large shareholders have the interest and ability to monitor the 
actions of managers. Many studies, however, show that the benefits of large 
shareholders may be more than offset by the private benefits of control that 
are not shared by minority shareholders (Yurtoglu, Haid; 2005), partly because 
families keep the majority control and coincide with the management in such 
countries. Owner-managers are so common and boards of the companies 
include family members or those who are related to controlling group. 
Consequently, this situation creates its own agency problem. The agency 
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problem in non-Anglo-Saxon countries is therefore, between the controlling 
shareholders (families) and minority shareholders.  
Bebchuk et al. included family firms in their managerial power approach and 
he suggested that there are more lucrative ways of rent extraction in such 
firms than executive compensation such as tunneling of resources between 
firms that belong to a business group and differentiating of cash-flow and 
control rights.  
The one-share-one-vote principle is based on the natural idea that 
shareholders who contribute equal amounts to the capital of a corporation 
should have equal rights to influence decisions (Yurtoglu, 2009). Violation of 
one-share-one vote principle is very frequent especially in civil law countries 
that offer weak protection to minority shareholders. Pyramidal structures, 
dual-class shares and cross-shareholdings are the main devices that the 
dominant shareholders use to increase their voting rights in excess of their 
cash-flow rights and hence establish the control of the firms.  
These violations in East Asian countries are mainly achieved through 
pyramidal structures and cross-shareholdings. Pyramids are frequently used in 
all European countries. Cross-holdings are very rare and used only in Austria, 
Germany, Italy, Norway and Sweden (Yurtoglu, 2009). 
Interestingly, dual-class shares and cross-shareholdings are present in the UK. 
Deviations from one-share-one-vote principle is less common yet present in 
North America (Gompers, Ishii and Metric, 2008; Villalonga and Amit, 2007). 
Existing empirical work suggests that deviations of control rights from cash-
flow rights distorts the incentives of large shareholders and leads to several 
inefficiencies from the point of view of minority shareholders including lower 
firm value (La Porta et al.,2002 and Claessens et al., 2002), lower dividends 
(Faccio et al., 2001 and Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2003), shareholder wealth 
reducing investment performance (Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu, 2004a) and 
inferior operating performance (Volpin, 2002).  
Gomez-Meija, Larraza-Kintana and Makri (2003) investigated the 
determinants of executive compensation in family-controlled public 
corporations observing  a sample of 253 family-controlled companies and they 
reported that family-member  CEOs of family controlled firms receive lower 
total income than outsider CEOs. They also found a negative relationship 
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between ownership concentration of the family and pay of family-member 
CEOs in such corporations.  
Firth, Fung and Rui (2005) examined the effect of firm performance on the 
level of executive compensation in a sample of 549 Chinese listed companies 
over the period from 1998 to 2000. Chinese listed firms exhibit concentrated 
ownership structures and in the vast majority of these firms the dominant 
shareholders have substantial controlling power gained through board 
representation and voting rights in excess of cash-flow rights. These dominant 
shareholders in Chinese listed firms are frequently state and local or regional 
governments. SOEs and private blocholders are other important owner 
identities. Another prominent feature of Chinese firms is that they do not 
have compensation committees or outside compensation consultant firms. 
Similar to Turkish case, the compensation reported in the annual reports of 
the listed companies is the total amount paid to the board of directors and 
components of the compensation is not reported. Two regression analyses 
are used, one to explain the level of pay and one to explain the changes in 
pay. The authors found a sharp increase in CEO pay over the considered 
period and they reported small pay sensitivities. They found differences in 
pay-for performance sensitivities for different ownership identities. They 
report that the pay does not depend on performance when the State is the 
controlling shareholder, suggesting that the State does not have profit 
objectives. There is a positive pay-performance relation in case of SOECGs and 
private blockholders as dominant shareholders. They attribute this positive 
relationship to the fact that SOECGs are based on profitability and private 
blockholders have profit objectives. The authors also observed significant pay-
for-performance sensitivities in the presence of foreign investors as 
controlling shareholders.  
Haid and Yurtoglu in their paper in 2006 examined the relationship between 
ownership structure and executive compensation in Germany. They analysed 
a sample of listed German companies from 1987 to 2003. The authors found 
that there is a substantial increase in average executive compensation and 
that the German companies pay a significant amount of their earnings to the 
executives as compensation. In their sample of firms, they reported that the 
impact of firm size on executive compensation is much more important than 
firm performance. The authors suggested that besides concentration level, 
the identities of the owners are also of great importance fo the determination 
of executive pay and they reported that in Germany executive compensation 
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is lower in the presence of banks as as block owners whereas, it is higher 
when the company is controlled by families. After examining the impact of 
ownership concentration at the direct level, the authors also investigated the 
effects of ownership concentration at the ultimate level and they reported 
that increases in the size of German companies lead to higher levels of 
executive pay when there is a divergence from one-share-one-vote principle. 
Moreover, they found that the relation between pay and performance is 
substantially weak if the voting rights deviate from cash-flow rights. Finally, 
the authors investigated the relationship between changes in executive pay 
and changes in shareholder wealth and they found that pay-for-performance 
sensitivities are low and it is further reduced as the ownership concentration 
increases.  
Cheng and Firth in their paper in 2005, investigated the effects of ownership 
structure and corporate governance characteristics on the level of 
compensation paid to top management in a sample of 336 firms listed on the 
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong from 1994 to 1999. In particular, they examined 
the effects of board composition, presence of institutional investors. Beside 
the compensation of the CEO, the authors also investigated how the 
remuneration of executive directors and the five highest paid employees are 
influenced by the above mentioned characteristics of the firm. As is also 
suggested by the authors, Hong Kong features a family-dominated business 
environment, and the directors own large proportion of equity capital. In 
accordance with their hypothesis, the authors found that the direct 
compensation paid to top management is lower when the directors have large 
ownership in the firm. They attributed this result to the fact that the directors 
would need less direct compensation because they already receive high levels 
of income from their large shareholdings. As mentioned before, the authors 
also empirically tested for the influence of institutional investors on the level 
of executive pay. They reported that the presence of institutional investors 
restrain not only the pay of CEO but also the level of compensation paid to 
executive directors and the five highest paid employees. The reason of their 
finding is most probably due to the monitoring and oversight functions of 
institutional shareholders. In contrast of what they hypothesized, the authors 
found a positive relationship between the number of non-executives on board 
and pay level of top executives. As an interpretation to this finding, they 
suggested that the non-executives owe their positions to the CEOs and that 
they try to set a higher benchmark for executive positions in general. As a 
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result of their empirical tests, the authors reported no significant evidence 
about the effect of non-executive directors and institutional shareholders on 
pay-for-performance sensitivity.  
 Cheung, Stauratitis, and Wong (2005) analysed the relationship between 
ownership structure and managerial compensation using a sample of 412 
publicly traded companies in Hong Kong during the period 1995-1998. They 
found a positive relationship between managerial  pay and managerial 
ownership up to 35% in small  firms while this relationship turns out to be 
negative when the ownership of the CEO exceeds 35%. The positive 
relationship between managerial pay and  managerial ownership exists only 
up to 10% managerial ownership in the large companies.  
Cohen and Launterbach in their paper in 2007 investigated the differences in 
pay between owner and non-owner CEOs  in Israel by analysing a sample of 
124 publicy traded firms. Different from previous research, they focused only 
on firms with concentrated ownership structures. The dominant shareholders 
in the firms they examined hold at least the 50% of the voting rights. The 
authors compared the pay levels of the CEOs with ties to controlling 
shareholder (owner CEOs) and the pay levels of the professional CEOs that 
have no connections with dominant shareholder (non-owner CEOs). They 
firstly hypothesized and then empirically proved  that the owner CEOs receive 
higher compensation than non-owner CEOs. Moreover, they found that the 
owner CEOs receive 50% higher pay than their professional couterparts and 
they also reported a lower pay-for-performance sensitivity for the owner 
CEOs. The authors additionally distinguished these closely held companies as 
the firms that are controlled by a family and the firms that are controlled by a 
partnership of a few individuals. They investigated the compensation of 
owner CEOs in family firms and firms controlled by a few individuals. They 
hypothesized that the owner CEOs in family firms would receive lower pay 
than the owner CEOs in partnership firms. However, they found no significant 
difference between family and partnership owner CEOs.  The regression 
models also control for firm size, firm industry and some sCEO-specific 
characteristics. The compensation data is the total direct pay. Overall, their 
results provide evidence that is consistent with the exploitation view which 
suggests that owner CEOs extract private benefits from the firm in the form of 
inflated pay and reduced pay-for-performance sensitivity which leads to 
expropriation of minority shareholders.  
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In their paper in 2006, Orbay and Yurtoglu investigated the effects of 
corporate governance structures on the corporate investment performance. 
They primarily focused on the impact of divergence from one-share-one-vote 
principle which constitutes a prominent agency cost observed in the firms 
with large shareholders. In order to determine the effects of deviations of 
cash-flow rights from voting rights on the investment performance, they 
worked with a sample of 218 firms listed on Istanbul Stock Exchange from 
1990 to 2003. In their research, the authors also provide an extensive insight 
about the ownership structures of Turkish firms. As the performance 
measure, the authors used the ratio of a firm’s returns on investments to its 
costs of capital. Orbay and Yurtoglu in this paper reported poor investment 
performance for the firms that are listed on the ISE. According to their 
findings, 1 Lira invested in Turkish companies generates assets worth 0.94 Lira 
(Orbay and Yurtoglu,2006). They attributed this poor performance to the 
existence of agency costs in the corporate governance structure of Turkish 
listed firms. Considering the effects of divergence from one-shar-one-vote 
principle and business group membership, the authors reported different 
impacts. According to their results, deviations from one-share-one-vote 
causes poor investment performance and it lowers the market value of the 
firm whereas, business group membership improves both the investment 
performance  and the market value of the firm.  
Ownership Structure in Turkey 
Turkey belongs to the civil law tradition of French origin which provides weak 
protection for the (minority) shareholders against the expropriation. A very 
prominent feature of corporate governance landscape in Turkey is its highly 
concentrated ownership structure with the largest direct shareholder holding 
on average 47% of the equity capital (Yurtoglu; 2003). Some literature 
consider concentrated ownership as a disciplining mechanism for the 
managers, by aligning the interests of both parties,  especially in the countries 
with weak shareholder rights. Nevertheless, due to the complex ownership 
structures the Turkish firms exhibit, it is difficult for the (minority) 
shareholders to distinguish whether the disciplining or the entrenchment 
effect prevails in Turkey.  
Holding companies at the direct level, and families at the ultimate level are 
the most frequently observed ownership identities in Turkey. 
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The following table provides information about the concentration of direct 
ownership in a sample of 218 firms listed in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE): 
 
 
FIGURE 3: 
 Source: Yurtoglu (2003) 
Holding companies are the most frequent owners at the direct level with a 
mean ownership of 47,62%. Holding companies in Turkey legally house the 
bussiness groups6 (BGs). They contain some financial and industrial 
companies that belong to the same business group. Most of the holding 
companies are controlled by families at the ultimate level. 
Another feature of Turkish corporate structure is deviation of cash-flow rights 
from control(voting) rights. Dominant shareholders in Turkey often establish 
control over their firms despite relatively small cash-flow rights. Dual-class 
shares, pyramidal structures and cross-ownership are used in order to 
increase control rights in excess of cash-flow rights. In addition to these 
devices, some control-enhancing corporate charter provisions are used by 
Turkish companies such as preferential treatment of the controlling owners in 
the design of board of directors and board supervisors, preferential treatment 
of the controlling owners in the determination of the dividend policy and 
preferential treatment of the controlling owners in case of liquidation among 
different classes of shares (Yurtoglu; 2003).  
                                                            
6 Business groups were not legally represented in the Turkish Commercial Code. The new 
Commercial Law recognizes and regulates the BGs in Turkey. 
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Among these devices, pyramidal structures are the most commonly used 
ones. Yurtoglu, Ararat and Orbay (2010) provide an example about pyramidal 
ownership structure.  
 
FIGURE 4: 
 
 
As seen in the figure, Dogan Gazetecilik has one controlling shareholder at the 
direct level, Dogan Yayın Holding having the 74.47% of the shares. The 
authors investigated further the owners of this direct shareholder (Dogan 
Yayin Holding). They found that Dogan family owns 2.3% of Dogan Yayin 
Holding and the largest shareholder is Dogan Şirketler Grubu Holding A.Ş. with 
an ownership of 63.02%. Dogan Şirketler Grubu A.Ş.  is owned by Adilbey 
Holding (52%), Dogan Family (13.7%). Since Adilbey Holding is totally owned 
by Dogan Family, the ultimate owner of Dogan Gazetecilik A.Ş.  is Dogan 
Family. The voting rights of Dogan family amount to 74.47% and the cash-flow 
rights amount to 32.54% which is substantially lower than voting rights.  
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Another common device used in Turkey to decrease cash-flow rights below 
voting rights is issuing dual-class shares that provides different amount of 
voting rights for different classes. 
Yurtoglu (2003), in his paper in which he examined implications of corporate 
governance for minority shareholders in Turkey, provide an example for the 
use of dual-class shares in Turkey. The following figure is the ownership 
structure of Selcuk Gida.  
 
FIGURE 5: 
 
 
Selçuk Gıda has two classes of shares. While having the identical face values, 
A-Shares carry 50 voting rights whereas B-Shares carry only one voting right. 
Dispersed owners own no A-Shares. The four largest shareholders own all A-
Shares. After necessary calculations are made, Yurtoglu reports that in total A-
Shares carry 78.18% of the voting rights and B-Shares carry only 21.82%  of 
the voting rights. The voting rights of Alharal family in Selçuk Gıda is 53.85% 
although their cash-flow rights are only 11.8%. 
As is shown in both examples above, Yurtoglu (2003) in a sample of 218 firms, 
tracked the ownership patterns to reach the ultimate shareholders and the 
true fraction of voting rights they own. Figure 4 displays his findings. 
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FIGURE 6: 
 
Source: Yurtoglu (2003) 
The mean control rights of the total sample is 66 percent although the cash-
flow rights amounts to only 54 percent. 
Families are the most frequent owners at the ultimate level. They ultimately 
control 173 firms out of a sample of 218 firms whereas, at the direct level 
they control only 42 firms in the same sample. Similar to the total sample, the 
control rights of the families are 66 percent despite having only 54 percent 
cash-flow rights. 
According to Yurtoglu (2003), the firms have lower valuation ratios  if there is 
a deviation of cash-flow rights from control rights.  
Yurtoglu reports in his works in 2000 and 2003 that ownership concentration 
and deviations of voting rights from control rights have a negative effect on 
ROA, market-to-book ratio and dividend pay-out ratios of listed companies in 
Turkey.  
Orbay and Yurtoglu (2006) report significantly better investment performance 
for companies that do not deviate from one-share-one vote by using 
pyramidal ownership structures, dual-class shares and other devices that 
enhance the control power of large shareholders beyond their cash flow 
rights. 
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3. DATA DESCRIPTION AND   SUMMARY STATISTICS 
The compensation data is collected from the notes that are attached to the 
financial tables of the companies which were available until 2008 on the 
website of ISE. Beginning from 2009, this information is available on the 
website of Public Disclosure Platform. 
The data used for the performance, size and ownership concentration is 
collected from the financial statements of the companies. 
The raw dataset consists of the observations of 305 companies during six 
years, from 2003 to 2008. Out of 305 firms, 102 have compensation 
observations for only three or less years. Since compensation is the 
dependent variable, it would not be meaningful to work with too many 
missing observations. In order to be able to present solid results, I worked 
with the companies that have compensation data for at least 4 years. After 
the elimination of the firms with missing compensation data, the final sample 
consists of 203 firms.  
In Turkey firms do not disclose remuneration on an individual basis. 
Additionally, not all the companies display the components of pay. Therefore, 
compensation data in the sample is the total compensation paid to executive 
management.  
Return on Assets (ROA) is used as an accounting measure of performance and 
total assets is used as measure of firm size.  
The companies are broadly grouped in three industries. The sample is 
dominated by manufacturing firms.  
Standard descriptive statistics about compensation, size, performance and 
ownership concentration data can be found in Table 1, providing means and 
standard deviations.  
Compensation shows a clear and substantial upward trend over time except 
year 2007. The mean compensation increases from 1.211.994 TRL to 
2.722.590 TRL over the six-year period. Highest compensations are paid in the 
finance sector.  
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Return on Assets (ROA) is used as a measure of firm performance. The mean 
ROA of the sample firms has an upward trend except year 2005 till 2007. Then 
in 2008, it decreases sharply to -1,01%. This decrease might be due to the 
2008 crisis. ROA is highest for the manufacturing firms in the sample.  
The mean size of the sample companies which is measured by total assets, 
increases from 737.000.000 TRL to 2.030.000.000 TRL. The largest companies 
are present in the finance sector.  
Concentration level stays stable over time. The ownership concentration is 
substantially high with a mean of 49,25 %. The highest concentration levels 
are found in the manufacturing sector. 
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4. MODELING APPROACH 
The models of executive compensation generally take the form as follows 
(Yurtoglu, Haid, 2005): ln(𝐶𝑖,𝑡) =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛾 ln�𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 � +  𝜇𝑖,𝑡      (1) 
𝑖 = 1, ……, N     and    t = 1,……, T 
where, 
𝐶𝑖,𝑡   stands for executive compensation  
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1  represents lagged performance of the company (ROA) 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1  is a measure of lagged firm size. (total assets) 
𝜇𝑖,𝑡 is the stochastic error term and it is assumed to have the usual properties. 
The time lag of 1 year is used because executive compensation is determined 
generally by size and performance levels of the previous year. 
I started with the full model by estimating equation (1) including all industries 
and years. By including all industries and years, it is assumed that the pay 
function is homogeneous across different industries and years. 
As a second step, homogeneity across industry groups is tested by estimating 
equation (1) for different industry groups.  
Then, I study the stability of regression coefficients over time by estimating 
regression (1) for each year separately.  
Later on, equation (1) is estimated by including various explanatory variables 
such as ownership structure and some firm-specific measures. 
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5. RESULTS 
As explained in the previous section, I estimated equation (1) including all 
industry and year dummies, thereby constraining slope parameter to be equal 
across industries and time. The first two rows of Table 2 report the estimated 
size and performance elasticities for the full model. The estimates have been 
obtained by OLS regression and robust regression. In both OLS and robust 
regression methods, performance and size coefficients are significantly 
positive. Size and performance have a statistically significant and positive 
impact on the total compensation paid to executives. 
As a second step, I check whether the assumption of a common slope 
parameter, in other words the assumption that the pay function is 
homogeneous for different industries, is correct or not. If there is 
heterogeneity between the industries in the way that compensation reacts to 
performance, then the assumption of a common slope parameter will 
produce biased estimates(Yurtoglu, Haid, 2005). 
As reported in Table 2, size coefficients for all the three industries are 
significantly positive. As the size of the firm increases, the level of total 
compensation increases as well. Both size and performance affect the 
compensation positively in the manufacturing sector; the coefficients are 
highly significant.  
In finance industry, however, only size has a substantial positive effect on 
compensation. Significance of performance coefficient is very low yet positive 
for the OLS method; it is even negative when I run a robust regression. In the 
finance industry, performance of the firm is not a very important determinant 
of compensation.  
Performance has a slightly insignificant positive effect on compensation for 
the utilities sector even when checked for both estimation methods. Size 
coefficient is highly significant and positive. 
We can clearly say that there is heterogeneity between industries. Therefore, 
by assuming a common slope parameter I cannot produce solid results. 
Lastly, I check for the heterogeneity across time. Since my observations are 
from year 2003 to 2008, it was not logical to generate subgroups for time 
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periods. That is why, I estimated equation (1) separately for each year. I have 
no output for the year 2003 because, I used one year lagged values of 
performance and size measures. Over five years-period, size has a significantly 
positive effect on compensation. Nevertheless, apart from year 2008, 
performance coefficient is significant only for year 2006, though positive for 
all years.  In 2008, performance coefficients for both estimates are large and 
significantly positive.  
Since the natural logarithm of size measure is used, the elasticity of size is its 
coefficient. Elasticity of ROA denoted by E is obtained by multiplying the 
coefficient of ROA and the related mean return on assets (ROA), separately 
for each year and industry.  The performance elasticity is 5% for the full model 
and highest for the year 2006.  
Consequently, it is obvious that compensation is heterogeneous across 
industries and time. Therefore, assuming a common parameter by restricting 
the slope parameter to be equal for all industries and years is an unrealistic 
assumption. 
 
IMPACT OF DIRECT OWNERSHIP 
Ownership concentration, in the literature, is accepted as an important 
determinant of executive compensation. That is why; a further explanatory 
variable is introduced to the model. Turkish companies exhibit a highly 
concentrated ownership structure. As mentioned in the summary statistics, 
the mean ownership at the direct level is equal to %49,25 in the sample firms.  
As an additional variable, percentage ownership of the largest direct 
shareholder is used.  All industry and year dummies are included in the 
regression. By performing this regression, the impact of ownership 
concentration on the total executive compensation can be observed. 
Regression 1 in Table 3 reports the estimation results. Both size and 
performance have a statistically significant and positive effect on total 
compensation. Ownership concentration variable is insignificant both in the 
OLS and robust regression models. Ownership concentration has an 
insignificant positive effect on executive compensation.   
To further investigate the effect of ownership concentration on 
compensation, I introduce the interaction of performance and ownership 
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concentration, and the interaction of size and ownership concentration to the 
model, including all year and industry dummies. The results are displayed in 
the second regression of Table 3.  
The interaction of performance and ownership concentration has a 
significantly negative effect; more importantly, the coefficients of ROA and 
ROA*LS has nearly the same magnitude but with opposite signs. If the 
ownership concentration is high, the impact of performance on total 
compensation decreases.  
SIZE*LS has a positive coefficient. If the ownership concentrated, then the 
effect of size on compensation increases insignificantly. 
 
 
IMPACT OF DEVIATIONS FROM ONE-SHARE-ONE VOTE 
As I have previously explained in detail that deviation from one-share-one-
vote principle is very frequently observed in the Turkish companies. One 
common device to differentiate control rights from cash-flow rights is issuing 
shares with multiple voting rights. In order to observe the effect of deviations 
of one-share-one-vote principle on compensation, I included a dummy 
variable in the model which takes on 1 if the firm has class of shares with 
multiple voting rights and zero otherwise. The estimates are displayed in 
Table 4. As is seen on the table, the presence of shares with multiple rights 
has a significant negative effect on the level of total compensation. Deviations 
from one-share-one-vote principle decrease the pay of executives.  
 
I interact deviation variable (DEV) with performance and size variables 
respectively to further explain the impact of deviation on compensation. The 
results are reported in the second regression of Table 4. ROA*DEV variable is 
insignificantly positive. SIZE*DEV variable is significantly positive implying that 
in the firms where control rights deviates from cash-flow rights, compensation 
decreases when size of the firm increases.  
 
 
   
32 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
In a sample of 203 stock market-listed Turkish companies, I analysed the 
impact of ownership concentration on the level of total compensation paid to 
executives. By the estimation of Equation (1) for the full model, I found that 
both performance and size of the companies have a statistically significant 
impact on the total compensation paid to executives. When the equation is 
estimated separately for each industry, the impact of company size on 
compensation is still highly significant and positive whereas, the effect of 
company performance on compensation is significant for only manufacturing 
firms. Yet, company performance has an insignificant impact on the 
compensation for finance and utilities sectors.  
Elasticity of pay-for-performance is higher in manufacturing and utilities 
industries whereas, it is substantially lower in finance industry that has the 
lowest level of ownership concentration. 
 
 Overall, with the provided results, it can be suggested that size is a more 
important determinant of executive pay than performance in Turkish 
companies. It is also evident in the sample; the firms with the largest mean 
size pay the highest mean compensation levels; these firms are found in 
finance industry. However; the manufacturing firms that have the highest 
mean ROA pay the lowest mean compensation. The evidence provided in this 
paper that size is a more important determinant of pay than performance is 
also consistent with the findings of many researchers who investigated the 
determinants of executive compensation. For example, Yurtoglu and Haid also 
reported similar evidence for the German stock-listed companies.  
 
Although it is accepted to be a very important determinant of compensation 
in the literature, I find only a moderating effect of ownership concentration at 
the direct level. The ownership percentage of the largest direct shareholder is 
used as a measure of ownership concentration at the direct level. It has an 
insignificant positive effect on compensation whereas, its effect turns out to 
be significantly negative when it is  interacted with performance suggesting 
that as the ownership concentration reaches higher levels, the effect of 
performance on executive compensation decreases. 
Effect of deviation from one-share-one-vote principle on compensation is 
controlled only for the case of shares with multiple voting rights. It has a 
significantly negative effect on the level of total executive compensation. 
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When investigated more detailed, it is found that in the firms where control 
rights are increased in excess of cash-flow rights, the compensation decreases 
when there is an increase in company size and executive compensation 
increases with an increase in company performance.  
A more comprehensive research can be conducted when some unfavourable 
data situations in Turkish listed companies change. In near future hopefully, 
the companies disclose the fixed and performance-related components of 
executive compensation in their annual reports. Also disclosure of executive 
compensation on an individual basis and disclosure of CEO-specific 
characteristics such as education, age and experience are of great importance 
to enable a more expanded research for the determinants of executive 
compensation in Turkey.  
With the new Turkish Commercial Code that had been approved by the 
Turkish Parliament on the 13th January 2011, most of the principles in 
Corporate Governance Guideline (launched by CMBT) are now mandatory. 
According to the new Code, the companies have to disclose their ultimate 
owners as well. This will ease to understand the complex ownership 
structures of the Turkish companies and also enables to conduct more solid 
research.  
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Compensation ROA Size LS 
  Mean SD mean SD Mean SD mean SD 
2003 1.211.994,00  1925481 4,23% 10,14% 737.000.000,00 3.500.000.000,00 49,25% 28,53% 
2004 1.367.312,00  2065222 4,98% 8,64% 911.000.000,00 4.280.000.000,00 49,25% 28,53% 
2005 2.600.601,00  5589162 4,92% 9,18% 1.240.000.000,00 6.390.000.000,00 49,25% 28,53% 
2006 3.098.328,00  6328158 5,46% 10,35% 1.490.000.000,00 7.560.000.000,00 49,25% 28,53% 
2007 2.750.113,00  4597199 5,87% 9,86% 1.690.000.000,00 8.660.000.000,00 49,25% 28,53% 
2008 2.722.590,00  3940459 -1,01% 22,21% 2.030.000.000,00 10.600.000.000,00 49,25% 28,53% 
                  
Manufacturing 2.070.443,00 2.980.988,00 4,36% 10,71% 491.000.000,00 1.170.000.000,00 54,40% 27,02% 
Finance 2.883.537,00 7.264.138,00 3,08% 19,56% 4.430.000.000,00 15.000.000.000,00 37,96% 29,09% 
Utilities 2.378.419,00 3.943.319,00 4,33% 8,92% 515.000.000,00 1.410.000.000,00 46,10% 28,90% 
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The absolute values of t-statistics are reported below the coefficients. 
TABLE 2: ESTIMATED SIZE AND PERFORMANCE ELASTICITIES 
 
Estimation Method SAMPLE Constant Performance E Size ADJ. R2 N 
                
OLS Full 0,958 1,303 0,05 0,686 0,57 791 
     2,16  3,60   30,39     
Robust Regression Full 1,546 1,115 0,05 0,664   791 
    4,11 3,62   34,61     
OLS Manufacturing 1,284 1,554 0,07 0,664 0,60 506 
    2,47 4,21   24,66     
Robust Regression Manufacturing 1,326 1,385 0,06 0,666   506 
    2,63 3,86   25,48     
OLS Finance 0,083 0,295 0,01 0,700 0,55 157 
    0,08 0,23   13,41     
Robust Regression Finance 2,035 -0,794 -0,02 0,623   157 
    3,40 1,10   20,93     
OLS Utilities 0,682 1,588 0,07 0,703 0,43 128 
    0,47 1,54   9,17     
Robust Regression Utilities 0,725 1,668 0,07 0,707   128 
    0,46 1,50   8,55     
OLS 2004 1,442 0,448 0,02 0,645 0,54 160 
    1,54 0,60   13,06     
Robust Regression 2004 2,007 0,367 0,02 0,625   160 
    2,10 0,48   12,42     
OLS 2005 1,040 1,146 0,06 0,685 0,52 131 
    0,92 1,10   11,54     
Robust Regression 2005 1,349 1,112 0,05 0,684   131 
    1,66 1,49   16,10     
OLS 2006 -0,933 2,785 0,15 0,737 0,57 133 
    0,83 2,78   12,76     
Robust Regression 2006 0,461 1,565 0,09 0,690   133 
    0,51 1,94   14,86     
OLS 2007 0,790 0,318 0,02 0,702 0,57 187 
    0,87 0,44   14,87     
Robust Regression 2007 1,340 0,730 0,04 0,674   187 
    1,66 1,13   16,10     
OLS 2008 1,003 2,040 -0,02 0,686 0,59 180 
    1,15 2,84   15,13     
Robust Regression 2008 1,559 1,687 -0,02 0,660   180 
    2,13 2,82   17,43     
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TABLE 3: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 
  
 
 
  Regression1 Regression 2 
  OLS Robust OLS Robust 
Constant 0,962 1,588 0,924 1,536 
  2,13 4,14 2,01 3,92 
PERFORMANCE 1,305 1,119 2,712 2,231 
  3,59 3,62 4,15 4,01 
SIZE 0,684 0,661 0,681 0,658 
  29,06 32,98 28,04 31,78 
LS 0,055 0,102     
  0,42 0,91     
ROA*LS   
 
-3,257 -2,605 
    
 
2,59 -2,43 
SIZE*LS   
 
0,011 0,013 
      1,51 2,02 
 
The absolute values of t-statistics are reported below the coefficients . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4: EFFECT OF DEVIATION FROM ONE-SHARE-ONE-VOTE   
PRINCIPLE 
 
 
 
 
  Regression 1 Regression 2 
  OLS Robust OLS Robust 
Constant 0,320 2,010 0,286 1,983 
  0,54 4,18 0,49 4,12 
ROA 0,956 1,199 0,745 0,948 
  2,11 3,24 1,52 2,37 
SIZE 0,69 0,625 0,692 0,627 
  24,30 26,94 24,36 27,03 
DEV -0,22 -0,271     
  2,12 3,21     
ROA*DEV     1,412 1,572 
      1,16 1,58 
SIZE*DEV     -0,017 -0,021 
      2,55 3,77 
      
The absolute values of t-statistics are reported below the coefficients. 
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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
The remunerations paid to top executives of stock market-listed companies 
have been under investigation especially since some corporate debacles such 
as Enron in the USA and Parmalat in Italy. Executive compensation issue 
attracted great attention both from academia and media. Amongst the 
questions asked, the most important ones are how executive compensation is 
arranged, whether performance is a key determinant of pay or the top 
managers of large companies are paid over their abilities, experience and 
performance. There is already a high number of research papers and 
newspaper articles about the determinants of pay at the top. Nevertheless, 
most of the research investigates the issue for the companies in the USA and 
the UK, so-called Anglo-Saxon countries. There is much less research focusing 
on the determinants of executive compensation in developing countries 
where the executive compensation as an “agency problem” has a different 
nature due to concentrated ownership structures and dominance of business 
groups that are mainly controlled by families.  
Turkey exhibits most of the features that are common also in other 
developing countries such as high levels of ownership concentration, weak 
minority shareholder protection and presence of business groups. That is why, 
investigating the determinants of executive compensation in Turkey also 
provides an insight about the nature of executive compensation issue in 
developing countries.  
Besides some information about corporate governance regimes and 
ownership structures present in the world, the thesis provides a more 
detailed examination of corporate governance environment ownership 
structure and evidence of determinants of executive compensation in Turkey.  
 
The analysis relies on an unbalanced panel dataset of 203 companies listed on 
the Istanbul Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2008. The results suggest that firm 
size is a more important determinant of executive compensation than firm 
performance  in Turkish firms. The results also suggest that the effect of firm 
performance on the level of compensation decreases as the ownership 
concentration of the company increases.  
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: 
Die Vergütung von Top-Managern börsennotierter Unternehmen ist 
spätestens seit den Skandalen um Enron in den USA und Parmalat in Italien 
ein besonders interessantes Thema sowohl für die akademische Forschung als 
auch für die mediale Berichterstattung.  
Diese Arbeit beschäftigt sich in diesem Zusammenhang vor allem mit den 
Fragen, welche Formen die Vergütung von Vorständen annehmen kann,  in 
wie weit das finanzielle Gebaren der Gesellschaft dabei eine Rolle spielt und 
ob die gerade bei großen Gesellschaften die Vergütung der Manager im 
Verhältnis zur deren Fähigkeit, Erfahrung und Leistung liegt.  
Obwohl bereits eine hohe Anzahl wissenschaftlicher Publikationen über die 
Determinanten der Manager-Vergütung zur Verfügung stehen, konzentrieren 
sich diese haupsächlich auf Unternehmen im englisch-sprachigen Raum. Bei 
weitem weniger werden selbige Determinanten für Gesellschaften in 
Schwellenländern oder sogar Entwicklungsländern beleuchtet, wobei gerade 
dort die Natur der Vorstands-Vergütung anders gelagert ist, da die 
Eigentümerstruktur konzentrierter ist oder eben noch weiter gehend das 
Unternehmen von einzelnen Familien(-Klans) kontrolliert wird. 
Im Speziellen beschäftigt sich diese Arbeit mit der Vergütung von Spitzen-
Managern in der Türkei, die wie in anderen Schwellenländer auch eine hohe 
Eigentümerkonzentration und einen eher schwachen Schutz von 
Minderheitseigentümern  aufweist. Die Arbeit beginnt mit einem kurzen 
theoretischen Abriss über die existierenden Corporate-Governance Regime 
und Eigentümerstrukturen ohne sich vorerst auf ein bestimmtes Land 
festzulegen. Dem folgt eine detailiertere Analyse am Beispiel der Türkei. So 
werden dann in einem weiteren Schritt ein Panel-Datensatz von 203 
Unternehmen, die and Börse in Istanbul notiert sind, über einen Verlauf von 
fünf Jahren (2003-2008) ökonometrisch untersucht. 
Die Ergebnisse lassen vermuten, dass die Unternehmensgröße eine 
entscheidendere Rolle hinsichtlich der Manager-Vergütung einnimmt als die 
Unternehmensperformance.  Des weiteren weisen die Ergebnisse dieser 
Studie darauf hin, dass der Effekt der Unternehmensperformance auf die 
Vergütung der Top-Manager mit steigender Eigentümerkonzentration 
abnimmt. 
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